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WHY RELEASE OF SECURITY DISCHARGES A SURETY
By H. W. ARANT*
is well settled that a creditor's release of security, under
ordinary circumstances, discharges a surety to the extent of the
value of the security released.' It makes no difference that the
surety was unaware, when he contracted, that the creditor had
other security2 or that the security released was obtained by the
creditor subsequent to the surety's promise.3 Neither does it
matter that the principal debtor is financially responsible so that
the surety can surely collect from him what the creditor claims of
the surety.4 The justification for this discharge of the surety is
almost invariably said to be the creditor's impairment of his right
of subrogation. That the surety should be so discharged under
T

*Dean of the College of Law, The Ohio State University, Columbus,
Ohio.
1
Cummings v. Little, (1858) 45 Me. 183; Lowe v. Reddan, (1904)
123 Wis. 90, 100 N. W. 1038, 3 Ann. Cas. 431; Kirkpatrick v. Hawk,
(1875) 80 Ill. 122; Union Nat. Bank v. Cooley, (1875) 27 La. Ann. 202;
Bank of Monroe v. Gifford, (1890) 79 Iowa 300, 44 N. X\;. 558; Weik v.
Pugh, (1883) 92 Ind. 382; Hubbard v. Pace, (1879) 30 Ark. 80; Henderson v. Huey, (1871) 45 Ala. 275; Durfey v. Kelly, (1917) 228 Mass. 571,
117 N. E. 907; Defiance Machine Works v. Gill, (1920) 177 Wis. 477,
175 N. W. 940; So. Surety Co. v. Merchants' & Farmers' Bank, (lnd.
App. 1928) 161 N. E. 842. See note 3 Ann. Cas. 433.
2
- 1Mayhew v. Crickett, (1818) 2 Swanston 185, 191; Lake v. Brutton.
(1856) 8 DeM. & G. 440; Duncan, Fox & Co. v. North & South W\ales
Bank, (1880) L. R. 6 App. Cas. 1; Hevener v. Berry, (1880) 17 V. Va.
474; Dempsey v. Dush, (1868) 18 Oh. St. 376; Scanland v. Settle,
(1838) Meigs (Tenn.) 169; Smith v. McLeod, (1844) 3 Ired. Eq. (N.C.)
390; 3 Wendell v. Highstone, (1884) 52 Mich. 552.
Lake v. Brutton, (1856) 8 DeM. & G. 440; Havens v. Willis,
(1885) 100 N. Y. 482, 3 N. E. 313; Smith v. McLeod, (1844) 3 Ired.
Eq. (N.C.) 390; Berlin Nat. Bank v. Guay, (1911) 76 N. H. 216, 81
Atl. 4475.
No case has been noted where the principal's financial responsibility
was urged as a reason why a release of security should not discharge
the surety but it is clear that this fact is immaterial if impairment of the
right of subrogation is the reason for the surety's discharge inasmuch
as the right of subrogation impaired by such a release relates solely
to the creditor's security. See Glazier v. Douglass, (1865) 32 Conn. 393.
5"A surety, upon paying the debt, is subrogated to the rights of the
creditor in any collateral security which the creditor holds for payment
of the debt. It follows that, if a creditor holding collateral security
surrenders it to the principal debtor without the knowledge or consent
of the surety on the debt, he thereby discharges him, to the extent of
the value of the property surrenderd." Morton v. Dillon, (1894) 90
Va. 592, 595, 19 S. E. 654.
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ordinary circumstances, there appears to be no reason to question,
and the generally accepted impairment-of-the-right-of-subrogation
theory appears quite adequate to explain the decisions where the.
surety is held to be discharged, if it be assumed that the proper
measure of damage for the violation of the surety's right is always the value of the security released.6 But, where the surety
is apparently properly held liable notwithstanding the creditor's
release of security, this theory seems to be inadequate.
For
example, the creditor may require payment, notwithstanding his
release of a part of his security when that which he retains is
ample,7 when he takes other security that is the equivalent of
that which is released,8 when his release of a part of his security
improves the value of that which remains," when he surrenders a
disputed claim as a reasonable compromise,'0 or surrenders security that was of no legitimate value, as where the debtor's interest
in the property mortgaged merely constituted a cloud upon title. 1
6
No case has been noted where damages have been recovered by
a surety from a creditor for breach of his duty to preserve his security
for the surety. If such a duty arose from an express promise, where
the same measure of damages would seem to be proper, there is reason
to believe that the measure of the surety's recovery would not be the
value of the security. In Bosch Magneto Co. v. Rushmore, (1915) 85
N. J. Eq. 93, 95 Atl. 614, 615, where specific performance of a promise to
give an indemnity bond was decreed, the court said: "In the case at
bar it is obvious that no more than nominal damages could be recovered
at law for the failure to furnish the bond."
"Damages are an inadequate remedy where there is no basis on
which a court of law could give substantial redress, and yet the defendant's promise is of value. It is on this ground that not only a
promise to ,give a mortgage of land, but also to give a mortgage or
pledge of personal property, though of a kind not ordinarily the subject
of equity jurisdiction, is enforced by equity. The probable value of
the security and the probable solvency of the debtor when the debt
shall mature, are factors too indeterminate to make the legal remedy
satisfactory." 3 Williston, Contracts, sec. 1421. See also 3 Williston.
Contracts, sec. 1411; Adderly v. Dixon, (1823) 1 Sim. & St. 607; Cutting
v. Dana, (1874) 25 N. J. Eq. 265.
7Saline County v. Brice, (1877) 65 Mo. 63. See Neff's Appeal,
(1845) 9 Watts & Serg. (Pa.) 36. But see N. H. Say. Bank v. Colcord,
(1844) 15 N. H. 119, 41 Am Dec. 685; Holt v. Bodey, (1852) 18 Pa.
St. 207.
$Young v. Cleveland, (1862) 33 Mo. 126, 82 Am. Dec. 155. See also
Lafayette County v. Hixon, (1879) 69 Mo. 581; State Bank v. Smith,
(1898) 155 N. Y. 185.
9Neff's Appeal, (1845) 9 Watts & Serg. (Pa.) 36.
IoBedwell v. Gephart, (1885) 67 Iowa 44, 24 N. W. 585; Berlin Nat.
Bank v. Guay, (1911) 76 N. H. 216, 81 Ati. 475.
"Hardwick v. Wright, (1865) 35 Beav. 133; Rainbow v. Juggins.
(1880) L. R. 5 Q. B. Div. 422; Blydenburg v. Bingham, (1868) 38
N. Y. 371, 98 Am. Dec. 49; Green v. Blunt, (1882) 59 Iowa 79, 12
N. W. 762; Lilly v. Roberts, (1877) 58 Ga. 363. See Com'l Bank v.
Western Reserve Bank, (1842) 11 Ohio 445; Moss v. Pettingill (1859)
3 Minn. 217.
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The same conclusion follows when the creditor is unaware of
"
the relations between the surety and the principal debtor, when
13
the surety is fully indemnified, or the creditor makes reasonable
use of his security to collect from the principal debtor. 4 In some
of the foregoing situations, there is conflict of decision. Those
cases holding that the surety is discharged do so on the logic of
the generally accepted theory that the surety's right of subrogation attaches specifically to the creditor's security as soon as he
obtains it, irrespective of when it is obtained or whether the
surety knew of it, and at least two courts went so far as to say
that the creditor's knowledge that the defendant was a surety was
unessential to the latter's defense."
Manifestly, those courts
holding the surety's obligation to be unaffected by the creditor's
release of security practically deny that the surety has the right
of subrogation, when the release takes place, as that right is
generally understood. A belief in the soundness of some of the
decisions denying the surety's defense has led the writer to inquire into the nature and extent of the surety's right of subrogation with a view to answering the question whether its impairment is the real basis of the surety's defense. If it is,
why, if ever, should exceptions be made in favor of the creditor; if it is not, what is the basis of the surety's discharge?
Under what circumstances does the surety have the right
of subrogation and what is it when he has it? If S is surety
for P's debt to C that is also secured by a mortgage on P's
farms Blackacre and Whiteacre, when S pays C, it is universally
2

1 Cullum v. Emanuel, (1840)

1 Ala. 23, 34 Am. Dec. 757; Patter-

son v.-Brock, (1851) 14 Mo. 473; Neimcewitz v. Gahn, (1832) 3 Paige
(N.Y.) 614; Parsons v. Harrold, (1899) 46 W. Va. 123. See Rogers v.
School Trustees, (1868) 46 Ill. 428; Guild v. Butler, (1879) 127 Mas.
386. Contra: Holt v. Bodey, (1852) 18 Pa. St. 207; Templeton v.
Shakley,
(1884) 107 Pa. St. 107.
l 3No case has been noted where an indemnified surety urged the
release of security as a defense. But such a surety is not discharged by
a release of the principal debtor. Jones v. \Ward, (1888) 71 \\,i!.
152, 36 N. W. 711. Nor by an extension of time. Home Nat'l Bank v.
Waterman, (1890) 134 Ill. 461, 29 N. E. 503; Smith v. Steele, (1853)
25 Vt. 427, 60 Am. Dec. 276; Fay v. Tower, (1883) 58 \Vis. 28t, lb
N. W. 558. It is generally assumed that such a surety would not be
discharged by a release of security. 21 R. C. L. 1054.
14 Coates v. Coates, (1864) 33 Beav. 249; Bedwell v. Gephart, (1885)
67 Iowa 44, 24 N. W. 585; Berlin Nat'l Bank v. Guay, (1911) 7o
N. H. 216, 81 At. 475; Rainbow v. Juggins, (1880) L. R. 5 Q. B. Div. 422.
' 5 Holt v. Bodey, (1852) 18 Pa. St. 207; Templeton v. Shakley.
(1884) 107 Pa. St. 107. See also New England, etc., Ins. Co. v. Randall,
(1890) 42 La. Ann. 260, 7 So. 679.
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agreed that he has a right to be subrogated to C's position as
mortgagee;"' but he does not have this right until C is fully
paid. 7 When, however, he does pay C in full, he has a right to
all of C's security and it is inconceivable that C could successfully resist his claim to be subrogated to his rights as mortgagee of both farms on the ground that the mortgage on Blackacre would be ample to secure the payment of what P then
owes S.' I
If C should voluntarily assign P's debt and the
mortgage securing it to S, neither law nor equity could find any
dereliction on his part; if he refuses to assign, equity will compel him to do so, if he still has the security, 1" or compensate
the surety for the damage done him if he disposes of the sectri-

ty after payment..2 1 If these assumptions are correct, the surety's
"right of subrogation" is merely a right to an assignment by
the creditor when he is paid and the remedy of subrogation
but another name for equity's decree vindicating that right. \Vhen
the creditor still has the security, the decree is the same as it would
be if C had expressly promised S that he would assign his security
upon payment .and had refused to assign after S paid and the
circumstances under which this decree would be refused are
doubtless identical in the two situations. Specific performance
of C's express promise to assign would be decreed because of the
inadequacy

of the remedy at law, 2 '

but,

for obvious reasons,

such a decree would be rendered only when it appeared that C
' 6 Dickson v. Sledge, (Miss. 1905) 38 So. 673; Hackett v. Watts.
(1897) 138 Mo. 502, 40 S. W. 113; Nelson v. Williams, (1838) 22 N.
C. 118: Vert v. Voss, (1881) 74 Ind. 565; Forbes v. Jackson, (1882)
L. R.7 19 Ch. Div. 615. See collection of cases 69 L. R. A. 528-34.
1 Grubbs v. \Vysor, (1879) 32 Gratt. (Va.) 127; Vert v. Voss , (1881)
74 Ind. 565; Welch v. Parran, (1844) 2 Gill (Md.) 320; Parker %.
Mercer, (1842) 6 How. (Miss.) 320, 38 Am. Dec. 438; Mathews v.
Switzler, (1870) 46 Mo. 301; Maryland Casualty Co. v. Fouts, (C.C.A.
4th Cir. 1926) 11 F. (2d) 71; United States v. Nat'l Surety Co., (1920)
254 U. S. 73, 41 Sup. Ct. 29, 65 L. Ed. 143.
' See Hackett v. Watts, (1896) 138 Mo. 502, 40 S. W. 113; Hollingsworth v. Floyd, (1827) 2 Harr. & G. (Md.) 87; Creager v. Bringle,
(1821) 5 Harr. & J. (Md.) 234, 9 Am. Dec. 516; Harper v. Rosenberger,
(1893) 56 Mo. App. 388; Smith v. Nat'l Surety Co., (1899) 46 App.
Div. 633, 62 N. Y. S. 1105; Gatewood v. Gatewood, (1881) 75 Va. 407;
Murrell
v. Scott, (1879) 51 Tex. 520.
' 9 See Hill v. King, (1891) 48 Oh. St. 75, 26 N. E. 988. No instance has been noted where a law court gave relief under such circumstances.
-0
°Morton
v. Dillon, (1894) 90 Va. 592, 19 S. E. 654.
21 See Shackley v. Davis. (1855)
17 Ga. 177; Triebert v. Burgess,
(1857) 11 Md. 452; Hall v. Omaha Nat'l Bank, (1872) 49 N. Y. 626;
Sullivan v. Turk, (1847) 1 Md. Ch. 59; Jones v. Brewer, (1899) 1 New
Br. Eq. 630.
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still had the security he promised to assign.-" Since S could
undoubtedly recover damages at law for breach of C's express
promise, it is clear that it creates in S a conditional right that
becomes unconditional or instantly enforceable upon payment of
the debt and is remediable both at law and in equity. No case,
however, has been noted where an ordinary surety brought an
action at law when a creditor refused to assign security upon
payment of the debt. The apparently universal resort to equity
was due either to the surety's uniform preference for the remedy
of specific performance or to the nonexistence of a remedy at
23

law.

But it is generally said that the surety's right of subrogation
is equitable. What this means is not entirely clear. It may refer
to the forum to which the surety usually resorted for the desired
remedy and may mean no more than would be meant by saying
that the right to specific performance of a promise to convey land
is equitable. But such a promisee could recover damages at law
and his substantive right is, with reference to the forum in
which he can obtain redress, both legal and equitable. Hence,
the statement that the surety's right of subrogation is equitable
does not necessarily mean that the right vindicated is exclusively
equitable, though the absence of legal precedent affords a slight
basis for the belief that courts of law did not recognize that the
surety had such a right against the creditor.2 4 The term "equitable" is doubtless often applied to the right of subrogation merely to suggest the nature of the circumstances giving rise to it,
22
See Woodward v. Harris, (1848) 2 Barb. (N.Y.) 439; Knott v.
Manufacturing Co., (1888) 30 V. Va. 790, 5 S. E. 266. Wright v.
Bell,2 3(1918) 5 Price 325.
In Morton v. Dillon, (1894) 90 Va. 592, 19 S. E. 54, where a
creditor surrendered his security to the principal debtor upon payment of a small balance due, the rest of the debt having been previously paid by the surety, chancery decreed that the creditor pay
the surety the value of the security released, it appearing that the
principal debtor was insolvent and that the value of the security
released was less than the amount paid by the surety. This case
is consistent with the view that there was no remedy at law against
the 24
creditor under such circumstances.
0f course the law courts professedly recognized the surety's
"right of subrogation" every time they held that the creditor's release
of security privileged the surety not to pay to the extent of the value
of the security released. Their refusal to recognize the surety's right
against the creditor affirmatively is not surprising when it is remembered that, at one time, courts of law did not even recognize
the surety's right of reimbursement from the principal whose debt
he had paid, in the absence- of an express promise. Ames, Cases on
Suretyship 499. n. 1.
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the most prominent suggestion being the absence of an express
promise.2 5 But, whatever the notion intended to be conveyed
by the application of the term "equitable" to the surety's right
of subrogation, the fact is that, upon payment, equity recognized
that the surety had a right to the security and would decree that
the creditor turn it over to him or pay him for the injury caused
by not doing so. No case having been found where the law
courts gave the surety remedy against the creditor under such
circumstances, it is at least arguable that the creditor, so far as
the surety was concerned, was legally privileged to do as he
pleased with the security. Positive proof that this was so, however, would require the discovery of cases in which law courts
refused the surety damages when the creditor refused to turn
over security in his hands after he had been paid.
In order further to test the limitations of the surety's "right
of subrogation," let it be supposed that the surety pays the creditor (1) without knowledge, and (2) with knowledge, that securities have been released.
If S pays C when C has reason to believe that S thinks he
still has security that has in fact been released, S may recover an
amount equal to the value of the security released as money paid
under mistake of fact.25 To the extent of the security released,
he supposes that he is discharging a debt where the creditor,
from the beginning, was in no danger of ultimate loss and his
only function was to relieve the creditor from inconvenience and
delay in collection. Contrary to his reasonable expectations, the
creditor's release of security has created a risk of ultimate loss
from which it could not have been contemplated that S should
protect him, but S pays with the reasonable belief that he will
succeed to the same risk of ultimate loss that the creditor's original transaction with the principal debtor involved. When this
is so, the surety obviously pays under a mistake as to a material
fact, and, since it was known to the creditor, he should recover
to the extent of the value of the security released.
25"The equitable character of the right (subrogation) is shown
by the fact that it is immaterial that the securities in question were
given after the contract of the surety was entered into. Or that
the surety was ignorant of the existence of security at that time."
2 \Villiston, Contracts, sec. 1266.
2
6Chester v. Bank of Kingston, (1857) 16 N. Y. 336; Cooper v.
\Vilcox, (1838) 22 N. C. 90, 32 Am. Dec. 695; Sumner v. Tuck. (1881)
10 Mo. App. 269. See Morrison v. Citizens Nat'l Bank. (1890) 65.
N. H. 253, 20 AtI. 300, 9 L. R. A. 282, 23 Am. St. Rep. 39.
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If the "right of subrogation" is a right to an assignment by
the creditor, as seems .to be the case, and the surety has the
"right of subrogation" before payment, as must be the case if
the creditor's release of security impairs it, the "right" is necessarily conditional in character.2-- If a surety has a conditional
right to an assignment of security before payment, it would
doubtless be like that of a surety to whom a creditor promises
that he will assign his security upon payment of the debt. In
the latter case, the creditor's release of security would render
him unable to perform the condition precedent to the surety's
duty to pay and the surety would not be liable. 8 If the surety
paid in ignorance of the fact that the creditor's release of security had entirely destroyed his duty to pay, he should recover, as
money paid under mistake of fact, the entire amount paid. But
he would not be limited to this remedy; he could recover damages for breach of the creditor's express promise to assign the
security. Such a promise would certainly give rise to an affirmative duty.2 9 It should be noted, however, that recovery of the
amount paid is amply justified on the ground that the payment
was made under a mistake of fact, namely, that the creditor had
maintained his ability to perform his promise to assign. Recovery to the same extent would be required upon the same
theory if the creditor made no express promise to assign but
the surety's promise to pay was upon the express condition that
the creditor assign.
To what extent does the position of the ordinary surety
differ from the cases supposed where there is an express agreement relative to the creditor's assignment of security? That
the ordinary surety can set up the creditor's release of security
as a pro tanto defense, if he knows of it, is generally agreed. "
It is likewise clear that lie can recover, as money paid under
mistake of fact, the value of the security released when he pays
without knowledge of the release. 3 ' His defensive power in the
first case and his offensive power in the second are less than those
of a surety to whom the creditor has promised an assignment of
27
See note 17, supra.
28Griggs v. Moors, (1897) 168 Mass. 354, 47 N. E. 128.
9
- In an action for damages for breach of such an expre,promise, it may be doubted whether the measure of recovery would
be the amount paid. See n. 6, supra.
3OSee Note 1, supra.
3'See Note 26. supra.
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his security or who promises to pay the creditor on condition that
the security be assigned. In the former case, assignment of the
security in accordance with his promise is a condition precedent
to the creditor's right to recover anything at all from the surety.32
In the latter, if the surety paid believing that the creditor had the
security to assign in accordance with his promise, he would be
able to recover the full amount paid. 33 However, instead of suing
to recover what he had paid, he undoubtedly could sue for damages
for breach of the express promise to assign the security.3 4 But
there is much reason to believe that an ordinary surety, who pays
without knowledge of the creditor's release of security, can not
recover, as damages, an amount equal to that recoverable by a
surety to whom the creditor had expressly promised to assign.
Courts would see no basis or necessity for the implication of an
affirmative duty and the surety would not succeed if he brought
an action upon this theory. Yet, if the surety has a right of
subrogation, whenever the creditor obtains security, conditional
upon payment, his payment should mature the creditor's duty, arid
his failure to perform it by assigning the security should render
him liable for such damage as results to the surety. No case,
however, presenting this theory of recovery by the surety has
been noted.
If an ordinary surety pays, when he knows that the creditor has
released his security, what are his rights? If the creditor expressly
promised to assign his security upon payment, it is clear that the
surety could not recover a payment made with knowledge of the
release of security under the mistake of fact theory. No reason
is apparent, however, why he should not recover damages for
breach of the creditor's express promise. He should be able to
perform, if he chooses to do so, and later recover whatever
damage results from the creditor's breach of his promise" just
as a vendee may pay for goods, knowing they are not as war3-Griggs v. Moors, (1897) 168 Mass. 354, 47 N. E. 128. Compare Walker v. Goldsmith, (1879) 7 Or. 161; Jones v. Kerr, (1860)
30 Ga. 93; Jeffries v. Lamb, (1880) 73 Ind. 202; Fay & Co. v. James

Jenks33 Co., (1892) 93 Mich. 130, 53 N. W, 163.

The creditor's inability to perform his express promise would

-empower the surety to rescind. See the reasoning in Ziehen v. Smith,

(1896) 148 N. Y. 558, 42 N. E. 1080.
3
4As to the measure of damages recoverable in such an action,
see Note 6, supra.
3
sSee 2 Williston, Contracts, sec. 679; Anson, Contracts, Corbin's
ed., sec. 365.
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ranted, and later recover the damage caused by the breach of
warranty.3 6 An ordinary surety who paid with knowledge that
the creditor had released his security, of course, could not recover
under the mistake of fact theory." 7 Since the surety's consent
to the, creditor's release of security is said to operate as a waiver
of his "right of subrogation," his payment with knowledge of the
release would doubtless have the sane effect. If this is so, it would
seem nearer correct to say that the creditor's retention of his
security is, to the extent of the value of the security, ordinarily a
condition precedent to the surety's duty to payb but the surety
may waive this condition either before or after the creditor's
release.3 0 Yet, if the surety had a right, in the ordinary sense, that
the creditor assign his security, it would seem that he, too, should
be able to pay the debt with knowledge that the creditor had
released the security and later recover whatever damage resulted
from the creditor's nonperformance of his duty. There is much
reason, however, to believe an ordinary surety could not recover
40
under such circumstances.
If the surety made payment without knowledge that the
creditor had previously taken security from the principal and
released it, he would doubtless be unable to recover anything from
the creditor upon any theory.4 ' This conclusion would be difficult
to justify if the generally accepted view that the surety's right
of subrogation attaches to any security the creditor has, irrespective
of when he obtains it or whether the surety knows of it, is correct.
The surety obviously cannot use the creditor's release of security
defensively if he doesn't know of it. He could hardly claim that
he had paid under a mistake of fact, and his inability to proceed
offensively would justify the statement that lie had no real right
against the creditor relative to the security but that his duty to
' 6 See 2 Williston,
Corbin's ed., sec. 399.

Contracts, secs. 702-717;

Anson,

Contracts,

3-See N. H. Say. Bank v. Colcord, (1844) 15 N. H. 119, 41
Am. 3 Dec. 685; Chester v. Bank of Kingston, (1857) 16 N. Y. 336.
8This usage was employed in Glazier v. Douglass, (1865) 32
Conn.
393.
3
3Mayhew v. Crickett, (1818) 2 Swanston 185; N. H. Sav. Bank
v. Colcord, (1844) 15 N. H. 119, 41 Am. Dec. 685; Thornton v.
Wynn,
(1827) 12 Wheat. (U.S.) 183, 6 L. Ed. 595.
4
4oSee cases cited, note 37, supra.
lThere could be no recovery on the theory of a payment under
a mistake of fact, and it was concluded above, though the point
does not seem to have been decided, that there could be no recovery of damages, even where the surety knew of the creditor's security but paid without knowledge of its release.
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pay him was merely conditional upon his retention of such security.
To say that he waives the condition when he pays without knowledge that the creditor had security is no stranger than to say that
a promisee makes his election by suing an agent when ignorant of
the fact that he acted for an undisclosed principal. Such a
promisee has a right against a principal of which he is ignorant,
and he loses it by suing the party with whom he intended to
contract and whose financial responsibility he trusted. The surety's
duty to pay is subject to a condition precedent of which he is
ignorant and when he pays the resulting situation is what he
expected it would be when he contracted, namely, that he would
have an unsecured claim against the principal debtor. The general assumption that the surety's right of subrogation depends
neither upon his knowledge that the creditor has security nor
upon when the creditor obtains it is doubtless correct when the
surety really has it. But, in the light of what the courts
actually do and decline to do for the surety, it seems reasonable to assert that he has no right of subrogation until the
principal's debt is fully paid. If he has a right tinder any other
circumstances, there seems to be no evidence that courts accord
to it the common and expected forms of vindication.
The pro tanto defense generally allowed the surety, when the
creditor releases security, as suggested above, can be explained
on the basis of an implied condition that the creditor must ordinarily retain his security. The implication of such a condition is
necessary to make the scope of the surety's undertaking correspond
to the scope of the risk that must have been contemplated by the
parties when he contracted, namely, the protection of the creditor
from such inconvenience and delay in collecting from the
principal as he cannot avoid by the use of reasonable prudence.
This is the only protection the creditor needs and the parties would
not be assumed to contemplate more in the absence of express
statement so indicating. To the extent of the value of his security
the creditor is in no position ultimately to lose. The surety's
protection does not require the implication of a right in his favor
such as would make the creditor liable in damages if he releases
the security or enable the surety to obtain an injunction to prevent
its release, and the courts seem never to have accorded the surety
these remedies; yet no reason is apparent why they should not
do so if the surety has a "right" against the creditor in any
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ordinary sense. To say that the surety has a right of subrogation
before payment that is invaded by the release of security, when
some of the most ordinary consequences of an actual or threatened
breach of duty do not follow, is not only not helpful but misleading and requires the creation of a number of exceptions not
required by the theory that the surety's undertaking is merely
subject to a condition precedent. Furthermore, the exceptions
made necessary by the adoption of the impairment-of-the-right-ofsubrogation theory and justified on the ground that the surety is
not injured are at variance with the attitude of the courts toward
the surety in other connections, e. g., when the creditor's extension
of time discharges the surety, irrespective of whether the surety
is injured, because it is said to impair his right of subrogation..'
If, then, the impairment-of-the-right-of-subrogation theory will
not explain all the apparently sound decisions, where the creditor's
release of security has been urged as a defense, will the theory
of an implied condition precedent rationalize more of them?'"
It would be too much to hope that any theory could be formulated
that would rationalize all of the cases. But, where the decisions
in a given fact situation are obviously in conflict, it is perhaps
enough to commend a theory that it offers a rational basis of
choice that is consistent with the conclusion reached in decisions
in other situations, where the creditor's release of security has
been urged as a defense and where there is little or no conflict.
Before attempting the formulation of a theory for which so much
is claimed, it is necessary to discuss in somewhat elementary
fashion the function of the surety in business transactions.
That the purpose of a surety's undertaking is either to decrease
the probability of ultimate loss to the obligee or to protect him
from the inconvenience and delay of enforced performance or
from both would be generally conceded. It would hardly be
claimed that an obligee needs a surety to protect him from any
of such loss as can be prevented by the use of reasonable prudence
on his own part. That unnecessary protection to the obligee is
42S~miiel v. Howarth, (1817)

3 Mer. 272: Pooley v. Harradine,

(1857) 7 El. & RI. 431; Swire v. Redman, (1876) L. R. 1 Q. B.
Div. 536: Oakley v. Pasheller, (1836) 4 Cl. & Fin. 207; Wilson v.
Lloyd, (1873) L. R. 16 Eq. Cas. 60; .Murray v. Marshall, (1884)
94 N.3 Y. 611.
4 Retention of security may be a condition precedent to the surety's
duty to pay when the creditor owes no duty to retain it. An express
or implied promise would be essential to the existence of a duty. See
Anson, Contracts, Corbin's ed., sec. 358.
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uncontemplated, in the absence of express statement to the contrary, and is, therefore, not within the scope of the surety's
promise would seem to be quite incontrovertible.
For example, an employer, contemplating the hiring of an
employee, realizes that his judgment that the employee is trustworthy may be wrong, however careful and thorough his investigation may have been. To remove the danger of ultimate loss
from such error of judgment as far as possible, the employer
requires a surety for the employee's faithful performance of his
duty. In the absence of express statement, it would not be sutpposed ordinarily that a bond was required in order that the employer might shift to the surety the hazard resulting from a reckless employment. An employer would rarely be willing to utilize
a surety to protect him from losses that he should expect when
he hires an employee known to have been dishonest. If the
prospective employee's previous dishonesty were made known to
the surety and he were willing to guarantee his future honesty
notwithstanding, an employer would rarely be willing to engage
him. Dishonest employees so cleverly conceal their defalcations
that the full extent of the employer's loss is often not discovered
until long after a suit or settlement has finally determined the
right of the employer against the surety, with the result that the
subsequently discovered loss goes uncompensated as far as the
surety is concerned. Hence, the only way in which an employer
can fully protect himself in such a case is to decline to employ
a person known to have been dishonest. Since this is the course
that an employer would almost invariably follow, a surety for an
employee is justified in believing that the employer is pursuing it,
unless he is informed to the contrary.4 ' It may be that the surety
is even justified in assuming that the employer knows, when he
hires the employee, what a reasonable investigation would disclose, unless he is informed that no such investigation has been
made.

4

1

Consider another illustration of a somewhat different type.
C is a merchant from whom P wishes to purchase goods on
credit. C may be unacquainted with P, or he may know him
and suspect that he would not or could not pay, or he may be44

London General Omnibus Co., Limited v. Holloway. [19121

2 K. B. 73; Railton v. Mathews, (1844) 10 C). & Fin. 934: 13ostwick
v. Van Voorhis, (1883) 91 N. Y. 353.
45See Graves v. Lebanon Nat'l Bank, (1873) 10 Bush (Ky.) 23,
19 Am. Rep. 50.
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lieve that he will pay as quickly as he can and that he will
ultimately be able to pay in full. Since the profit from doing
business with him, if P pays as he promises, is as great as the
profit from doing the same amount of business with any one
else, C cannot be indifferent to the proposal of P to purchase
his goods. In the event, however, that he considers the danger
of P's nonperformance too great to permit an attempt to make the
profit contemplated, he will suggest that P induce S to become
his surety. But C would not be understood to require that P
,induce S to become his surety in order that he might entirely
ignore the fact that P is his debtor or depart substantially in his
dealings with him from those practices that would be pursued
by ordinary business men in dealing with their debtors, though
a part of C's reasonable and, therefore, contemplated purpose
may be to avoid the possible inconvenience and delay incident
to enforced ultimate payment from P, as well as the danger
of loss due to P's inability or refusal to pay. In the event
that P does not pay as he promises, it is obviously advantageous
to be able to call upon a responsible surety from whom prompt
payment can be expected. This advantage, for which it is quite
legitimate for the creditor to stipulate, is entirely consistent, however, with the requirement that the creditor conform to ordinary
business practices in his dealings with P. For this reason, a
creditor who releases his debtor 40 or refuses his tender of the
amount due4 - cannot require payment by the surety; whatever
loss results from the debtor's nonpayment in either case is caused
by the creditor's uncontemplated act. Prevention of loss under
such circumstances is so obviously within the creditor's power
that it could not have been contemplated as within the scope
of the surety's undertaking. If the creditor had been asked
whether he expected the surety to pay after he had released
the principal or declined to accept payment from him, the answer
would undoubtedly have been in the negative. Since a creditor
does not need protection from loss that follows such unusual
and stupid conduct upon his own part, it cannot be assumed that
4'Lewis v. Jones, (1825) 4 B. & C. 506; Brown v. Ayer, (1858) 24
Ga. 288; Anthony v. Capel, (1876) 53 Miss. 350; Paddleford v. Thatcher,
(1876) 48 Vt. 574. See 2 Williston, Contracts, sec. 1220.
47
: Spurgeon v. Smitha, (1888) 114 Ind. 453, 17 N. E. 105; Life
Association of America v. Neville, (1882) 72 Ala. 517; Fisher v.
Stockebrand. (1881) 26 Kan. 565.
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the surety's undertaking was to be operative under such circumstances.
Not infrequently an applicant for credit agrees to place his
property in pledge with the creditor or execute a mortgage upon
it. To the extent of the value of the property to be pledged
or mortgaged, the creditor is entirely free from danger of ultimate loss; only depreciation or destruction of the property can
prevent the creditor's ultimate collection to the extent of its
original value. A comparison of its value with the amount of
indebtedness contemplated shows the creditor approximately the
maximum risk of ultimate loss involved. But the possibility
of the depreciation or destruction of the security, when its value
is equal to or even greater than the indebtedness contemplated,
as well as a desire to avoid the possible inconvenience and delay
of enforced payment, may lead a cautious creditor to require
the debtor to supplement such sqcurity with the undertaking
of a surety. Under such circumstances, the prospective surety
considers the possibility that the debtor may not pay as he agrees
but he also considers the ultimate certain payment by the debtor
to the extent of the value of the property pledged or mortgaged.
Since, to the extent of the value of his security, when it may be
necessary to realize upon it, the creditor has no risk of ultimate loss, the surety reasonably supposes that, to this extent,
the creditor requires his undertaking only for the purpose of
escaping the inconvenience and delay incident to enforced payment. He would not ordinarily suspect that a creditor, having
taken security, would throw away his advantage by releasing it.
Such an act, under ordinary circumstances, would be a departure
from ordinary business practice and the resulting risk of loss,
therefore, not within the scope of the surety's undertaking. To
whatever extent the creditor's security may prove to be hiadequate, the surety assumes the risk of ultimate loss, but to the
extent of the value of the security, he assumes no such risk but
merely assumes the burden of paying the creditor money that
he could not ultimately lose in order to save him the inconvenience and delay of enforced payment.
In the foregoing discussion, it has been assumed that the
surety knew of the creditor's security, but it seems quite clear
that such knowledge is not a prerequisite to the surety's reasonable expectation that the dealings of the creditor with the
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debtor will conform to the practices of ordinary business men.
The creditor, under all circumstances, is expected to recognize
the fact that P is his debtor and the purpose of the surety's
undertaking is understood to be to protect him from such danger
of loss or inconvenience in collection as he may not evade by the use
of reasonable business prudence. It seems reasonable, therefore,
to say that the parties contemplate that the creditor's dealings
with the debtor will always accord with the requirements of ordinary prudence and this includes the expectation that, under
ordinary circumstances, the creditor will utilize in the ordinary
way any security he has or may acquire from the principal. This
expectation is justified by the fact that creditors ordinarily do
not release security. Any release, therefore, under ordinary circumstances, is uncontemplated and this is so whether the surety
knew that the creditor had security when he promised or whether
the security was obtained subsequent to his promise; it is a departure from ordinary business practice that produces a danger of loss
from which the creditor does not need the surety's protection and is,
therefore, not within the contemplation of the parties. If the
creditor were specifically asked whether he expected the surety
to protect him from the danger of loss caused by his release of
security that the surety did not know of or that he might subsequently acquire, it seems reasonable to believe that the answer
would be in the negative. If this is so, there is the same reason
for construing the surety's undertaking to be subject to the
implied condition precedent that the creditor retain his security
that exists where the surety knows of the security. If this approach to the defense of release of security be adopted in the
various fact situations already mentioned, what conclusions will
be reached as to whether the surety should be discharged ?
Under ordinary circumstances, if a creditor releases security,
he departs from the practice of ordinary business men. In most
of the cases where the surety was discharged to the extent of the
security released, there were no special circumstances tending to
make the creditor's act appear to be prudent or reasonable. The
mere fact that tle creditor accepted the security of the surety's
supplementary obligation indicates that he regarded the principal's
security an insufficient. Its release. when he neither realizes anything from it nor takes other security in its place, on the face of
it, seems to be unbusinesslike. The creditor doubtless acts on
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the assumption that he need not bother about the prospect of collecting from the principal because he has the promise of a responsible surety. Such an attitude he may not take because it is inconsistent with what was contemplated as the surety's function in the
transaction, namely, to save him from such risk of loss and
inconvenience as he cannot evade by the use of ordinary business
prudence. To the extent to which he releases security, he himself creates a risk of ultimate loss. Since protection from loss
caused by the creditor's own act is not the function of the surety's
undertaking, the general conclusion that the surety is discharged
pro tanto appears to be just and is reached by regarding the
creditor's retention of security, to the extent of its value, under
ordinary circumstances, as a condition precedent to the surety's
duty to pay.
In the few cases that are reported where a creditor released security but claimed that the surety should not be discharged because
the security retained was ample, the decisions are in conflict. 4
Whether the surety should be discharged or not should depend
upon the answer to the question whether the creditor's act, under
the circumstances, measured up to the requirement of ordinary
business prudence to which the creditor must always conform in
his dealings with the principal debtor. Do creditors who have
taken a superabundance of security ordinarily release any part
of it? If so, the creditor's release of some of it may possibly
conform to the standard of ordinary business prudence and it
may be argued that his act, under the circumstances, was within
the contemplation of the parties. But, with much force, it may
be contended that it is always unbusinesslike to relinquish security
that one has seen fit to take; else why take it? This argument
seems to represent the better view in the ordinary case. But if
a creditor had originally received ample security and the debtor
had reduced his indebtedness to such an extent that the creditor was extravagantly secured, it would seem that the debtor
might reasonably request that the creditor relinquish a part of
his security. If he might, the creditor's release of a part of his
security would not be a departure from ordinary business practice. If, however, the debt had not been decreased, it would
seem difficult for the creditor to justify the release of any part
of his security, in view of the fact that he had once regarded
48See Note 7, supra.
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it as sufficiently inadequate to justify him in requiring or accepting the supplementary security of a surety's obligation. Hence,
under ordinary circumstances, it would seem that any release of
security would be a departure from business practice; if so, to
the extent of the value of the security released, it is a breach
of the condition precedent to the surety's promise to pay, causing
his discharge pro tanto.
If the creditor releases security and accepts other security in its
stead, his conduct may be entirely reasonable if the substituted
security appears to be the reasonable equivalent of the security
released.4 9 In such a case, the creditor should be required to
prove that the substituted security was equal in value to that which
was released5 0 When this is so, the danger of ultimate loss
to both creditor and surety remains the same; the creditor's
act causes no uncontemplated risk. Hence, it would seem reasonable to hold that the surety's obligation is unaffected, under
tliese circumstances, but that he is discharged to any extent to
which the substituted security may be less valuable than the
Since the surety's right of subrogation is
security released.
necessarily impaired by the creditor's release of the security to
which it relates, and since his right attaches to security as soon
as the creditor obtains it, it is clear that the view that a surety
is not discharged by the creditor's release of security, when he
obtains in its place other security of equal or greater value, cannot be reached if the impairment-of-the-right-of-subrogation
theory is applied. Yet, such a holding appears to be reas.onable
and would be justified under the theory that the creditor's dealing with his security as would a business man of ordinary prudence is a condition precedent to the surety's duty to pay.
Where the creditor's security from the debtor constitutes a
mere cloud on title, its release does not affect the obligation of
49
"No authority has been cited, and we have been able to find
none holding that a creditor may not in gool faith endeavor to better
his situation by exchanging one kind of collateral for another that he
regards as more valuable. If a bank holds bonds of doubtful value
as security for a note made by sureties for the principal debtor. may
it not exchange those bonds for others that it regards of greater
value without releasing the sureties? If it cannot, the law deprives
it of the right to make the best use of its collateral that it can, and
compels it to refrain from trying to better its condition, lest, although
acting honestly and for what it regards as for its own interest as
well as the interest of the sureties, it may make a mistake to their
detriment." State Bank v. Smith, (1898) 155 N. Y. 185, 199, 49
N. E. 680. See cases Note 8. supra.
50
OState v. Smith, (1898) 155 N. Y. 185, 49 N. E. 680.
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the surety? 1 The debtor's interest being of no value, the surety's
right of subrogation is not impaired; at least, he is said to sustain no injury. This is so if the creditor's retention of the
interest received from the principal would not enable him, under
the circumstances, to realize anything. Even though the debtor's
interest may be a mere cloud on title, the creditor might, nevertheless, exact compensation for its relinquishment. Of course,
no court should encourage the creditor to do this, but he might
and, if the creditor might, the surety, upon payment, might
likewise do so. According to the generally accepted theory of
the surety's right of subrogation, he has a right that the creditor
retain whatever advantage he acquires from the principal and
the surety's claim that he is damaged by the creditor's release
to the extent to which the payment of money to remove the
.cloud on title could have been compelled seems to accord with
the facts. But, under the theory that the creditor's conformity
to the standard of conduct of a reasonably prudent business mai
is a condition precedent to the surety's duty to pay, his relinquishment of his security under such circumstances would be
without effect upon the surety's obligation, because an ordinary
business man would not resort to extortion to collect the principal's debt from other persons.
Where the creditor releases a part of his security for the
purpose of improving the value of that which remains, it has
been held that the surety is not discharged, as where a creditor
releases a part of the debtor's land from the lien of a judgment
in order that it may be sold, it being agreed that the procceds
from the part sold will be applied to the payment of a debt
secured by a mortgage that was a superior lien on all of the
debtor's land.52 The creditor's action, under such circumstances,
accords with business prudence. It does not ignore the fact the
principal is the debtor and is consistent with a purpose on the
creditor's part to see that he pays. This result, however, cannot
be justified under the impairment-of-the-right-of-subrogation
theory. It can hardly be said that the creditor's destruction of
the surety's right by his release does not impair it.
Where the validity of a claim assigned to the creditor as security is disputed, its release by the creditor in return for what would
be regarded in a compromise as a reasonable sum does not affect
5lBlydenburgh v. Bingham, (1868) 38 N. Y. 371, 98 Am. Dec. 40.
r 2Neff's Appeal, (1845) 9 Watts & Serg. (Pa.) 36.
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the surety's obligation. 53 The creditor's act represents an attempt
to collect the principal's debt from his assets, and, if the corn-promise is reasonable, he measures up to the standard of conduct
of a prudent business man under the circumstances, fulfilling the
condition precedent to the surety's duty to pay. Even this very
reasonable conclusion would appear to be inconsistent with the
surety's right of subrogation as it has been stated by one court."
Where the surety is indemnified by the principal, neither
the creditor's release of the principal nor his extension of the
time of payment affects the surety's obligation. The basis of
this view is the generally conceded right of the creditor to utilize for the payment of his debt any security given to the surety
by the principal,15 and this right of the creditor doubtless exists
no matter how much security he himself may have taken from
the principal. By analogy, the indemnified surety would probably be held notwithstanding the creditor's release of security."
Is this conclusion defensible under any theory? In holding the
surety personally liable notwithstanding the creditor's release.
the courts go much further than is necessary to vindicate the
creditor's right to subject the surety's security to the payment
of his. debt; and, in so doing, they place upon the surety the
burden of paying the creditor and later realizing upon whatever
he had that caused the court to say that he was "indemnified."
53

See NQte 10, supra.
"When the creditor intends to look to the surety for payment.
he is compelled to preserve, unimpaired, all his rights against the
debtor. If the creditor therefore does any act without the surety's
consent, which impairs his rights of subrogation or the means of
enforcing his claim against the principal in case he should be called
upon to pay the debt, the surety will be discharged. The sureties
in the case may have desired to pay their obligation, which was for
$2500 each, and take the assets of their principal to the extent and
amount of securing them against loss, and administer them for their
5

benefit. . . . The plaintiff contends that the acts of the company in

taking the property of Randall, operated an advantage to the sureties.
and therefore they have no cause to complain. Admitting this to
be so, the surety stands upon the strict terms of his contract, and
even should the act be beneficial to them, if it in any way changes
the contract of suretyship, the surety will be discharged. .

.

. In this

case it is clear that the creditor by his own act has changed the
contract of the surety and placed it beyond the power of the contpany to subrogate the sureties to its rights against the property of
Randall." McEnery, J., in New England Mutual Life Ins. Co. V.
Randall, (1890) 42 La. Ann. 260, 265, 7 So. 679.
55
Royal Bank v. Commercial Bank, (1882) L. R. 7 App. Cas. 366:
Franklin County Nat'l Bank v. Greenfield Bank. (1885) 138 .Mass.
515; Nat'l Bank of Newburgh v. Bigler, (1880) 83 N. Y. 51.
S6See Note 13, supra.
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So long as the surety is so "indemnified" that there is no chance
that what the principal gave him may not produce as much
money as he is required to pay the creditor, this burden is the
only apparent objection to holding the surety liable, but, since
the indemnity is usually in the form of a bond, pledge or mortgage, involving the probable inconvenience of a suit, sale or
foreclosure, it is obvious that the burden is not negligible."
The creditor's release of security, when the surety is indetnnifled, appears to be quite as contrary to prudent business practice
as does his release of a part of his security when he claims
that which he retains to be ample. It was suggested above that
this, under ordinary circumstances, should discharge the surety
pro tanto. Moreover, it is quite obvious that the view that the
creditor's release of security does not discharge an indemnified
*surety pro tanto denies to such a surety the right of subrogation to the creditor's security. It is believed that no court would
deny this right where such a surety actually paid the creditor
and the creditor still had his security. If this is so, an indemnified surety would seem to have as much right of subrogation
to the creditor's security before payment as any other surety,
and it would be absurd to say that his right is not impaired
when the creditor releases his security. If it is said that the
creditor's release does not injure an indemnified surety, it may
properly be observed that courts generally make no inquiry into
this matter. At any rate, the surety is deprived of an aml)litude
of security that he may be presumed to have relied on, particularly
when he knew of the creditor's security when he contracted. If
he may be deprived of this, under these circumstances, there is
no logical reason why he should not be held when the creditor
releases a part of an overabundant security. If the absence of
damage in the sense that the surety is sure to be able to collect
from the principal is to justify holding the indemnified surety.
it would seem not only logical but fair to hold all sureties in
favor of creditors who release security to debtors about whose
solvency and ultimate ability to pay there is no doubt. No court,
however, has ever held that the debtor's financial responsibility prevents the creditor's release of security from discharging the
surety pro tanto.
37Moreover. where the surety's security is in the form of a pledge
or mortgage, there is always the danzer that the property pledged
or mortgaged may depreciate or be destroyed.
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Under the theory that the creditor's retention of his security
is, to the extent of its value, under ordinary circumstances, an
implied condition precedent to the surety's duty to pay-because
such retention is ordinary practice.-the surety's liability should
be dependent upon the answer to the same inquiry suggested
where the creditor releases some of his security but retains what
appears to be anple, namely, did the creditor's act accord with
prudent business practice under the circumstances? It seems
reasonable to contend in either case that the creditor's act is
abnormal and produces an uncontemplated risk of loss. The most
plausible argument that can be made in favor of not discharging
the indemnified surety is that he shows that he does not rely on
the creditor's protection when he, in substance, secures payment
in advance from the principal. Everything considered, however,
it seems fairer to require the creditor to get his money out of
the surety's security rather than to place the burden of so doing
upon the surety.
When the surety assents to the creditor's release of security,
his obligation is unaffected by -the creditor's act. If, however,
he has a right in any ordinary sense to the creditor's security,
under general contract principles, there would be some difficulty
to his relinquishing it after the creditor's release without consideration. But, if the creditor's retention of security is merely a condition precedent to the duty to pay, implied for the surety's protection, there is no difficulty about his waiving it at any time.
Implication of duty and condition are equally easy but it is
obvious that there is a good deal of difference between creating a right in the surety and implying a condition to his duty.
WThy should either be done? Manifestly. in order that justice
may be done between the parties. But the requirements of justice can be known only at the end of an inquiry as to what
risk the surety assumed when he contracted. More emplhasis
upon this inquiry would lead to a more rational conclusion in
most of the cases dealing with defenses by the surety.

